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DRAM SHOP

LAW-GAMBLING WHILE INTOXICATED:

THE WINNER

TAKEs IT ALL? THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXAMINES A CASINO'S LIABILITY
FOR ALLOWING A PATRON TO GAMBLE WHILE INTOXICATED

Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held
that under New Jersey dram shop law, a gambling casino patron cannot
maintain a tort action against a casino to recover gambling losses that accrued while the casino allowed the intoxicated patron to gamble.' Statistics show that a strong relationship exists between gambling and alcohol
consumption.2 According to one survey, gamblers consume alcohol on
four times as many days per year as non-gamblers. 3 Also, as the gambler's
wagers increase, the level of alcohol the gambler consumes rises. 4 Some
commentators have even proposed that it is precisely because New Jersey
casinos and the New Jersey Legislature realize the strong correlation between alcohol consumption and gambling that New Jersey's Casino Control Act 5 specifically allows for complimentary alcoholic- beverages to be
distributed to gambling patrons.6 A significant number of people consume alcohol while they gamble, and intoxicated gamblers may lose their
ability to make rational decisions, causing them to lose substantial
1. See Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 292-93 (3d Cir.
1995) (explaining dram shop liability refers to liability of tavern for acts of intoxicated patrons). See generallyJulia A. Harden, Comment, Dramshop Liability: Should
the Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 227 (1987)
(stating that dram shop liability refers to tavern's liability for acts of intoxicated
patrons). A dram shop is a saloon or bar where spirituous or intoxicating liquors
are sold. Id. at 227 n.7 (citing Snow v. State, 9 S.W. 306 (Ark. 1888)).
2. Jeffrey C. Hallam, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Should Intoxicated Gamblers Recover Their Losses , 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 240, 241 (1990) (citing M. KALLICK ET AL., A
SURVEY OF AMERICAN GAMBLING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 71 (1971)); see also Ruling
Could Leave Casinos Cryingin Beer, CHI. T~iB., June 23, 1989, at C2 ("Many gamblers
will not drink alcohol 'because it dilutes the decision-making process .... ' (quot-

ing Jim Wise, spokesman for TropWorld Casino and Entertainment Resort)).
3. Hallam, supranote 2, at 241 (citing KALLICK ET AL., supranote 2, at 71, 74).
4. Id.
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to -210 (West 1988).
6. See id. § 5: 1 2-103(g) (1) (allowing casinos to serve free alcoholic beverages
to gambling patrons as long as patrons request alcoholic beverage); GNOC Corp.
v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 656 (D.N.J. 1989) (noting that alcohol is "seldom

available to patrons on a complimentary basis outside of gambling parlour"). Additionally, the Aboud court stated that the "potent effects of intoxicating substances
on reasoning and judgment are not lost on casino proprietors.., who make liquor
readily and plentifully available to patrons while they are in the act of gambling."
Id.

(1255)
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amounts of money. 7 Despite this correlation, the Third Circuit has predicted that the NewJersey Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of
action under New Jersey dram shop law against a casino that allows a patron to gamble while intoxicated. 8
In Part II, this Casebrief examines the theoretical and historical development of dram shop liability. 9 Part III considers the applicability of New
Jersey dram shop law to casinos and gambling losses.10 Part IV discusses,
in detail, the Third Circuit's recent decision in Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj
Mahal Associates. 11 Furthermore, Part IV explores the relevance of contractual claims against a casino for losses sustained by a patron while intoxicated and problems regarding proximate causation. 12 It also examines
Judge Becker's lengthy dissent in Hakimoglu.1 3 Finally, Part V discusses the
practical implications that the Hakimoglu decision has for attorneys practic14
ing in the Third Circuit.
II.

DRAM SHOP LIABILITY

A.

HistoricalDevelopment

At common law, a person injured by an intoxicated individual had no
cause of action against the tavern that provided the intoxicated individual
with alcohol.' 5 Consequently, neither the intoxicated person, nor an in7. Hallam, supra note 2, at 242; see alsoJ.G. Hull & C.F. Bond, Social and Behavioral Consequences of Alcohol Consumption and Expectancy: A Meta-Analysis, 99
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 347, 356 (1986) (stating that "alcohol consumption appears to
have strong, relatively homogeneous effects of impairing information
processing").
8. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1995).
9. For a discussion of the historical development of dram shop law, see infra
notes 15-61 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the applicability of NewJersey dram shop law to casinos, see infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
11. 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the decision in Hakimoglu
and the approach taken by the Third Circuit in that decision, see infra notes 77105 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of contractual claims against a casino and proximate
cause, see infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of Judge Becker's dissenting opinion in Hakimoglu, see
infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the implications that the Hakimoglu decision has for
practitioners in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
15. Suzette M. Nanovic, ComparativeNegligence and Dram Shop Laws: Does Buckley v. Pirolo Sound Last Callfor HoldingNew Jersey Liquor Vendors Liablefor the Torts of
Intoxicated Persons?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 238, 238 & n.1 (1987). This common
law rule was based on the premise that the intoxicated person's consumption of
the alcohol, not the selling of the alcohol, was the proximate cause of any alcoholrelated injury. Id. at 238 n.1; seeJames M. Goldberg, One for the Road: Liquor Liability Broadens, A.B.A. J., June, 1987, at 86 (stating that proximate cause and remoteness barred liquor liability suits against tavern owners in past). Thus, the

intoxicated person was considered the sole cause of the injury. Harden, supranote
1, at 228. This reasoning was used in most states to bar recovery by both injured
intoxicated persons and injured innocent third parties. Id.; see Ashley v. Harrison,
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nocent third party, could recover against a tavern owner for any injury
caused by intoxication. 16 In the mid-nineteenth century, however, during
the temperance movement, the gradual development of dram shop law
commenced. 17 Wisconsin passed the first dram shop statute in 1849 and
required tavern owners to post a bond to pay for any damages or expenses
that accrued as a result of a patron's intoxication. 18 Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and Maine followed Wisconsin's lead and passed dram
shop statutes in the late 1850s.19
Today, many states have enacted dram shop statutes. 20 For the most
part, these statutes have been enacted to curb driving under the influence
of alcohol and to compensate innocent individuals injured by intoxicated
1 Peake 149, 3 Rev. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1793) (dismissing libel action because alleged
injury was too remote from alleged wrongful act). In Ashley, the court stated:
If this action is to be maintained, I know not to what extent the rule can
be carried. For aught I can see to the contrary, it may equally be supported against every man who circulates the glass too freely, and intoxicates an actor, by which he is rendered incapable of performing his part
on the stage.
Id.

At common law, it was believed that a person should not be able to escape
from responsibility for his or her actions by becoming intoxicated, and that selling
liquor to an "able-bodied" person should not be considered tortious because the
purchaser should be held responsible for his or her own actions and because the
liquor vending business is legitimate. See Snyder v. West Rawlins Properties, Inc.,
531 F. Supp. 701, 701-02 (D. Wyo. 1982) (stating early common law rule); Wright v.
Moffit, 437 A.2d 554, 555 (Del. 1981) (reasoning that dram shop's negligent selling of alcohol to "able-bodied" person who then injured third party or himself did
not create liability for dram shop); Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (Ill. 1889) (stating early common law rule); Fisher v. O'Conner's, Inc., 452 A.2d 1313, 1315 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (stating that sale of liquor to strong and "able-bodied" man
was traditionally not tortious act).
16. Harden, supra note 1, at 228.
17. See Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86 (discussing history of dram shop law).

Dram shop liability refers to third party liability for the service of liquor. Id. at 84.
Prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibitionists lobbied state legislatures to pass dram shop acts designed
to control alcohol consumption. Richard B. Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the
Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175. The mood surrounding the period of
the temperance movement has been depicted as "the mighty clamor of the early
1870's known as the Woman's Crusade, which set thousands of furious females
marching against the saloon with prayers on their lips and destruction in their
hearts." Vincent L. Ricci, Comment, Dram Shop Liability: A Judicial Response, 57
CAL. L. Rv. 995, 999 n.25 (1969) (citation omitted).
18. Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction Tort: Imposing Common Law Liability on Merchants for Sales and Leases to 'Defective" Customers,
1988 DuKE L.J. 755, 767 n.72. Wisconsin was the first state to pass a dram shop
statute, requiring tavern owners to post a bond to "'support all paupers, widows
and orphans, and pay the expenses of all civil and criminal prosecutions growing
out of orjustly attributable to ... traffic in alcoholic beverages."' Goldberg, supra

note 15, at 86 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
19. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86.
20. Id. Dram shop statutes are often referred to as civil damages acts. Id.
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persons.2 1 Dram shop statutes impose a duty upon tavern owners to patrons and third persons sustaining injuries resulting from the tavern's negligent service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated customers.2 2 Dram shop
statutes also permit an innocent third party injured by an intoxicated patron, or an intoxicated patron who suffered injuries, to bring a civil action
against the person who sold the intoxicated patron alcohol after he or she
23
was visibly intoxicated.
Many states that have not enacted dram shop statutes have judicially
recognized a common law cause of action against tavern owners based on
the negligent sale of intoxicating liquors. 24 This common law liability permits recovery for damages against a negligent tavern owner and, in some
states, a social host. 25 Common law 'liability for servers of alcohol assumes
that the server is expected to foresee damages resulting from serving liquor to an intoxicated person and, therefore, owes a duty to protect
26
against that risk of harm.
B.

Development in New Jersey

During Prohibition, New Jersey had a civil damage law that imposed
strict liability for compensatory and punitive damages upon unlawful sellers of alcoholic beverages. 2 7 This civil damage law was repealed in 1934
and was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, which explicitly
prohibited the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons. 28 Today, however,
New Jersey's common law dram shop liability doctrine recognizes that a
21. Id. at 84-87.
22. Hallam, supra note 2, at 244.
23. Nanovic, supra note 15, at 238 n.2. "The average drunk driving accident
may result from the risk-producing activities of two parties: the motorist who drives
an automobile after becoming intoxicated and the liquor vendor who sells alcohol
to the motorist who is incapacitated because of intoxication or other condition."
Ricci, supra note 17, at 995.
24. Nanovic, supra note 15, at 238-40. "Most states now impose some form of
liquor liability on licensed servers of alcoholic beverages, either by statute orjudicial decree." Goldberg, supra note 15, at 84.
25. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 84-86. For further discussion of the development of social host liability in NewJersey, see infra notes 40-50 and accompanying
text.
26. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86. In addition, "courts have handled dram
shop cases using one of three basic theories of liability: (1) negligence per se for
violations of beverage control statutes; (2) common law negligence; and (3) pure
negligence." Nanovic, supra note 15, at 240. New Jersey imposes dram shop liability under common law negligence principles. Id. at 241; see Rappaport v. Nichols,
156 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1959) (holding that negligently and unlawfully serving alcoholic beverages to minor created recognizable, foreseeable and unreasonable risk
of harm to intoxicated person and members of traveling public).
27. Prohibition Enforcement Act, ch. 103, 1921 N.J. Laws 184, 184-193 (repealed 1934); Law of March 17, 1922, ch. 257, 1922 N.J. Laws 628, 628-630 (repealed 1934).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-1 to -96 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). The Division
of Alcoholic Beverage Control provided in a regulation that no licensee shall permit any minor to be served or consume any alcoholic beverages. Rappaport, 156
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tavern owner who serves alcoholic beverages to a patron may be found to
have created an unreasonable risk of harm and may be held liable for the
injuries that result when the tavern owner knows or should have known
that the patron was intoxicated. 29 In addition, the common law liability of
alcoholic beverage servers was modified in 1987 by the New Jersey Li30
censed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability Act.
New Jersey first imposed dram shop liability under the principles of
common law negligence in 1959, holding that an innocent third person
could recover from a tavern owner for injuries caused by an intoxicated
patron.31 In Rappaport v. Nichols,3 2 the Supreme Court of NewJersey held
a tavern liable for an innocent third party's injuries when the tavern had
unlawfully and negligently sold alcoholic beverages to a minor causing his
intoxication and, in turn, causing his negligent operation of a motor vehicle.3 3 The court stated that:

A.2d at 8. The same regulation contained a provision against service to, or consumption by, any person "actually or apparently intoxicated." Id.
29. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp 625, 632 (D.N.J.
1994), affd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995); see Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 218
A.2d 630, 637 (N.J. 1966) (holding that operators of tavern are liable under common law negligence for damages proximately resulting from service of alcohol to
patron whose intoxicated condition is known or should have been known by
server); Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 9 (holding that tavern's negligent and unlawful sale
of alcohol to minor contributed to minor's negligent operation of automobile).
This common law rule has also been extended to social hosts in certain situations.
See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984) (finding liability for social
host who provides alcohol to adult guest knowing guest will soon drive); Linn v.
Rand, 356 A.2d 15, 17 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976) (finding that social host may be
liable for serving alcohol to minor guest when minor's subsequent acts cause injury
to innocent third party).
30. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). A "licensed
alcoholic beverage server" or "server" is defined as "a person who is licensed to sell
alcoholic beverages pursuant to R.S. 33:1-1 et seq. or who has been issued a permit
to sell alcoholic beverages by the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control in the
Department of Law and Public Safety." Id. § 2A:22A-3.
Section 2A:22A-4 states that "[t]his act shall be the exclusive civil remedy for
personal injury or property damage resulting from the negligent service of alcoholic beverages by a licensed alcoholic beverage server." Id. § 2A:22A-4.
In addition, a "licensed alcoholic beverage server shall be deemed to have
been negligent only when the server served a visibly intoxicated person." Id.
§ 2A:22A-5(b).
31. Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 9-10. In Rappaport,eighteen year-old Robert Nichols was "wrongfully and negligently sold and served alcoholic beverages" at a tavern. Id. at 3. The tavern owners sold and served Nichols with "notice or
knowledge" that he was a minor. Id. Upon leaving the tavern, Nichols drove his
car on a public highway and collided with a car operated by Arthur Rappaport. Id.
Rappaport died as a result of the injuries received in the collision. Id. Rappaport's
wife, the administratrix of his estate, brought an action for damages against the
tavern alleging that the tavern had negligently served alcohol to the minor and,
therefore, had proximately caused or contributed to her husband's death. Id.
32. 156 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1959).
33. Id. at 9. The court recognized that most of the other courts that had
previously dealt with this issue had rejected such claims. Id. at 4-5; see Cole v.
Rush, 289 P.2d 450 (Cal. 1955) (rejecting claim against tavern owner for injuries of
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[I]f the patron is a minor or is intoxicated when served, the tavern keeper's sale to him is unlawful; and if the circumstances are
such that the tavern keeper knows or should know that the patron is a minor or is intoxicated, his service to him may also con34
stitute common law negligence.

third party caused by intoxicated patron), overruled by Vesely v.Jagera, 486 P.2d 151
(Cal. 1971); Fleckner v. Dionne, 210 P.2d 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (dismissing count in complaint that tavern keeper had unlawfully and negligently sold
liquor to minor while he was intoxicated and that minor drove car while intoxicated and collided with plaintiff's car causing injuries); Cowman v. Hansen, 92
N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1958) (rejecting claim against tavern keeper on ground that sale
of alcoholic beverage was "too remote" to be considered proximate cause of injury), overruled by Lewis v. State 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977); State ex rel. Joyce v.
Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754 (Md. Ct. App. 1951) (sustaining dismissal of claim against
tavern keeper on ground that sale to intoxicated minor could not be considered
proximate cause of later automobile collision).
The Rappaportcourt, however, also cited Pennsylvania case law holding taverns
liable for the injuries inflicted by their intoxicated patrons. Rappaport,156 A.2d at
5-7. In Manning v. Yokas, 132 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1957), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated:
If a drunken minor staggered from a saloon and fell over a child, it could
not be argued that his fall was not the consequence of the furnishing of
the liquor. So far as liability is concerned, there can be no difference
between an injury caused through one's falling body and an injury inflicted by one's automobile under his management and control. If an
innkeeper plied a minor with whiskey to a degree that the minor became
offensively aggressive and, while under the influence of the liquor, injured another with a knife, it could not be doubted that the innkeeper,
under the Act of 1854, would be liable for those injuries. An automobile
when handled recklessly by its driver can be a weapon no less damaging
and no less fatal than a knife. That the negligent operation of the automobile by Kordowski caused the accident is unquestioned in this appeal.
But Kordowski's negligence was the result of his imbibing intoxicating
liquor supplied by Yokas. Yokas thus, under the Act, became as much
responsible for the accident as if he had stripped the gears of the car or
had damaged the steering wheel, which defects in the operation of the
car were directly responsible for the uncontrollability which caused the
collision.
Id. at 199-200; see also McKinney v. Foster, 137 A.2d 502, 504-08 (Pa. 1958) (stating
that it is foreseeable that patron illegally served alcohol might negligently drive
automobile and cause injury to persons or property). Both of these cases were
based on an 1854 Pennsylvania dram shop statute. Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 6; see
Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86 (stating that Pennsylvania Legislature passed Dram
Shop Act in 1854). After the 1854 statute was repealed, however, Pennsylvania
recognized a common law cause of action. Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 6; see Schelin v.
Goldberg, 146 A.2d 648, 651-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (holding that unlawful sale
of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated patron constituted common law negligence).
34. Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 9. The court further stated:
When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an
intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor
or the intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling public may
readily be recognized and foreseen; this is particularly evident in current
times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so commonplace
and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent.
Id. at 8.
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In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc.,3 5 New Jersey extended its theory of
common law dram shop liability to compensate intoxicated patrons for
injuries they themselves sustained. 36 Additionally, in Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill
Corp.,3 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defendant tavern could
not use contributory negligence when a third party was injured by an intoxicated bar patron.3 8 The court did not want to allow a third party's
negligence to defeat his or her claim against a bar patron who had acted
39
negligently while under the influence of alcohol.
35. 218 A.2d 630 (NJ. 1966).
36. Id. at 636. After drinking at home, John G. Soronen entered the Olde
Milford Inn where he was served two shots of whiskey and three beers. Id. at 631-

32. After about two hours, Soronen stood up from his stool, took several steps and
fell, hitting his head against a steel column. Id. at 632. Soronen died later the
same day from a skull fracture. Id. Soronen's widow brought an action for wrongful death, asserting that the Olde Milford Inn had negligently served alcoholic
beverages to Soronen while he was visibly intoxicated and that this negligent conduct had proximately caused or contributed to Soronen's death. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court extended its holding in Rappaportby stating:
[W]hen injuries proximately result to a third person from service to a
patron who is visibly intoxicated, the tavern keeper may fairly be held
civilly accountable. In further aid of the policy, a tavern keeper may with
equal reason be held civilly accountable for injuries which proximately
result to the patron himself. The accountability may not be diluted by
the fault of the patron for that would tend to nullify the very aid being
afforded. Since the patron has become a danger to himself and is in no
position to exercise self-protective care, it is right and proper that the law
view the responsibility as that of the tavern keeper alone.
Id. at 636.
Holding that the tavern was solely liable for the patron's injuries, the court
rejected the Olde Milford Inn's defense of contributory negligence. Id. Contributory negligence consists of an "act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care
on [the] part of [the] complaining party, which, concurring with [the] defendant's negligence, is [a] proximate cause of [the] injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1033 (6th ed. 1990). Traditionally, a finding that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent barred him or her from any recovery. Id.
37. 284 A.2d 180 (1971).
38. Id. at 182. In this case, Alita Aliulis was a passenger in a car driven by an
intoxicated driver. Id. at 181. An automobile accident occurred and Aliulis was
injured. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the lower
court which stated that "for reasons of policy clearly enunciated in Rappaport and
Soronen, contributory negligence is not available as a defense to the tavern in the
circumstances here presented." Id. at 182 (quoting Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp.,

275 A.2d 751, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), affd, 284 A.2d 180 (1971)).
39. Id. The court reasoned that Aliulis had no other means of transportation
and no real choice in order to get home but to ride with the intoxicated driver. Id.
Nonetheless, the court limited its holding to the specific factual circumstances:
We are not now prepared to say that in no case may the contributory
negligence of an injured third party defeat his action against a seller of
alcoholic beverages to underage or intoxicated persons. Suppose, for example, that an intoxicated minor driver, who had been served drinks by a

defendant tavern keeper, collides with a plaintiffs car [that] had disregarded a red traffic light. We leave the availability of the defense in that
and other analogous situations until the question is precisely presented.
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In the 1976 case of Linn v. Rand,40 New Jersey extended its common
law dram shop liability to encompass social hosts who served alcohol to
minors and then allowed the intoxicated minors to drive, causing injury to
an innocent third party.4 1 In Rand, the Superior Court of NewJersey held
that social hosts may be held responsible, concluding that " [i] t makes little
sense to... give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the same
wrongful conduct [as a tavern keeper] merely because [the social host] is
unlicensed." 42 In Kelly v. Gwinnel 43 the NewJersey Supreme Court went a
step further and extended social host liability to cover situations in which
the intoxicated social guest is an adult. 44 Since the New Jersey Supreme
40. 356 A.2d 15 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
41. Id. In Rand, Thomas Nacnodovits served alcoholic beverages to Lucy
Rand, a minor, while she was a guest at his home. Id. at 16. Nacnodovits then

allowed Rand to drive her car from his home. Id. While driving, Rand struck a
pedestrian, Glenn Linn, and caused him serious injury. Id.
The court addressed the issue of "whether a person (not the holder of a liquor license), who furnishes excessive amounts of intoxicating liquors to a minor
on a social occasion, may be held liable for the intoxicated minor's negligent acts
which cause injury to an innocent third party." Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 18.
43. 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
44. Id. at 1224. In this case, Donald Gwinnell spent a few hours at the Zaks'
residence, during which time he stated that he had consumed two or three drinks.
Id. at 1220. While driving home from the Zaks' house, Gwinnell was involved in a
head on collision with an automobile operated by Marie Kelly, who was seriously
injured in the accident. Id. The result of a blood alcohol test prompted an expert
to conclude that Gwinnell had consumed the equivalent of thirteen drinks and
"must have shown unmistakable signs of intoxication while at the Zaks' home." Id.
Kelly sued the Zaks for her injuries as a result of the accident. Id. The trial court
granted the Zaks' motion for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that "New Jersey has no Dram Shop Act imposing liability on the
provider of alcoholic beverages, and that while [New Jersey's] decisional law had
imposed such liability on licensees, common-law liability had been extended to a
social host only where the guest was a minor." Id. at 1221 (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell,
463 A.2d 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding, concluding that a social host has a duty of care to protect the guest and third parties from
injury that could be caused by the intoxicated guest. Id. at 1222. The court
pointed out that the only difference between this factual situation and the one in
Rand was that in Rand the guest was a minor. Id. at 1223. Consequently, the court
held that a host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the
guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for
injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication. Id.
at 1224. The court noted that just compensation to the victims of drunk driving
and the deterrent effect of social host liability outweigh the interest of maintaining
enjoyment at social gatherings. Id.
The court recognized that the holding in Gwinnell could be regarded as inconsistent with Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, 298 A.2d 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972). Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8. In Anslinger, the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court refused to impose liability on business associates for
injuries a drunken guest suffered after leaving their social affair. Anslinger, 298
A.2d at 86-89. The court in Gwinnell stated that despite Anslinger, policy considerations warrant imposing this duty on social hosts. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d at 1224 n.8; see
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Court's decision in Gwinnel, New Jersey has one of the broadest interpretations of social host liability in the country. 45 Although NewJersey's common law dram shop liability is extensive, there are limits to liability. In
Griesenbeck v. Walke, 46 the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a negligence cause of action, under common law dram shop liability, did not
exist against a social host for an injury resulting from a fire at an intoxicated guest's residence.4 7 The fire occurred after the guest returned
home after having been served liquor by social hosts. 4 8 The court based
its holding on the conclusion that the injuries in this case were in no way
foreseeable by the social hosts. 49 Because the injuries were not foreseeable, the social hosts owed no duty to the injured parties and there was no
50
cause of action under NewJersey's principles of dram shop liability. Jen51
sen v. Schooley's Mountain Inn, Inc. also limited dram shop liability based
also Figuly v. Knoll, 449 A.2d 564, 564-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (holding

social host liable on similar facts).
45. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86. After Gwinnel other states adopted social
host liability for intoxicated guests. Id. For examples of states that adopted host
liability after Gwinnell see Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
and Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985). In addition, Georgia,- New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin imposed liability on social hosts for serving minors. Goldberg, supra note 15, at 86.
46. 488 A.2d 1038 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
47. Id. at 1043-48.
48. Id. In this case, Caryl Griesenbeck, the mother of two children, went to
her parents' home to welcome them back from vacation. Id. at 1039.
Griesenbeck's father served her two drinks, after which she drove home. Id. Later

that evening, the Griesenbecks' home caught on fire, killing Caryl, her husband
and their son. Id. It was determined that the fire was caused by a cigarette left

burning in a sofa. Id. at 1040. The plaintiffs contended that Griesenbeck's parents
had served Caryl drinks while she was obviously intoxicated and permitted her to
leave their home in that condition. Id. The plaintiffs also contended that because
Griesenbeck was impaired by alcohol, she either caused the fire or was so intoxicated that she was unable to take necessary and proper precautions to alert her
family of the fire and escort them to safety. Id.
49. Id. at 1042. In order for the social hosts in this case to be liable, they had
to foresee the "enhanced hazard to the Griesenbeck children, who presumably

were then home and in bed, of their mother returning from her parents' home in
an intoxicated condition, and by reason thereof, causing the home to become inflamed, and then being unable to rescue the children from the burning building."
Id. A reasonably prudent person would not foresee this sequence of events as a
result of serving alcohol to Griesenbeck. Id. Therefore, there was no duty on the
part of the social hosts to have refrained from serving alcohol to Griesenbeck in
this case. Id. In addition, the court held that public interest does not make it
necessary to extend a host's liability for serving liquor to an intoxicated guest to
harmful acts of the guest not related to the operation of a vehicle and otherwise
unforeseeable. Id.
50. Id. Actionable negligence, which is the theory upon which New Jersey
dram shop liability is based, requires the existence of a duty to act or not to act
arising by reason of the actor's creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable
harm. Id. at 1040 (citing Kelley v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (N.J. 1984)).

51. 522 A.2d 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
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on a lack of foreseeable injury. 52 In this case, the New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Division held that a tavern owner had no duty to exercise
care when the injury that occurred was not reasonably foreseeable by the
53
tavern.
In Buckley v. Pirolo,54 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that
New Jersey's Comparative Negligence Act applies to cases involving dram
shop liability. 55 Comparative negligence is a theory that allows a plaintiff
56
to recover as long as the defendant is more negligent than the plaintiff.
In Buckley, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a limited comparative
52. Id. at 1044-45. In Jensen, Donald Jensen was served alcoholic beverages at
Schooley's Mountain Inn even after he was visibly intoxicated. Id. at 1043. In the
evening, Jensen left Schooley's while he was still drunk and drove about eight
miles to a nearby river. Id. For unknown reasons, Jensen proceeded to climb to
the top of a tree. Id. The branches near the top of the tree broke and Jensen fell
to the ground, rolled into the river and drowned. Id. Jensen's wife brought an
action for wrongful death alleging that Schooley's wrongful conduct in serving
Jensen while he was intoxicated proximately caused his death. Id.
53. Id. at 1044-45. The court, noting earlier New Jersey cases, stated
"[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a
weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public
interest in the proposed solution."' Id. at 1044 (quoting Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1222);
see also Portee v.Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (NJ. 1980) (stating that whether liability
for negligently inflicted emotional harm should be expanded depends ultimately
on balancing of conflicting interests involved); Hill v. Yaskin, 380 A.2d 1107, 110711 (NJ. 1977) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965) (defining
negligent conduct and duty to act or not to act).
54. 500 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1985).
55. Id. at 704. After work, three men, including Charles Pirolo, went to the
Forked River House Tavern. Id. While there, Pirolo drank several beers and several shots of whiskey. Id. In the afternoon, the trio went to a friend's house where
they consumed more alcohol. Id. Later, they returned to the Forked River House
Tavern where Pirolo drank more beer. Id. Pirolo suggested that the group take a
plane ride and he would pilot the plane. Id. at 705. After an initial flight, which
ended without incident, Pirolo decided to pilot a second flight. Id. On this second flight, the plane struck a radio tower, killing all of the plane's passengers,
including Pirolo. Id. Several wrongful death suits were brought against the tavern,
alleging that the tavern was negligent for serving alcoholic beverages to Pirolo
when the tavern knew, or should have known, that he was intoxicated. Id.
The jury found that the passengers, who had voluntarily flown with Pirolo,
had been collectively more negligent than the tavern, but it shaped its verdict so
that the tavern would not benefit from the patrons' negligence. Id. at 706. The
appellate court found that the Comparative Negligence Act could be applied to
dram shop cases, but expressly limited its decision to the particular facts of Buckley.
Id. at 704. The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed that the Comparative Negligence Act applies to plaintiffs' claims against a tavern under New Jersey's dram
shop rule. Id.
56. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to .8 (West 1995). NewJersey's Comparative
Negligence Act provides, in relevant part, that:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
the death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not
greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons
against whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be dimin-
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negligence defense for taverns in a dram shop action.5 7 The court later
modified Buckley in Lee v. Kiku Restaurant.58 In Lee, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a jury should consider the extent to which a
patron's injuries were caused by his or her own conduct in drinking to the
point of intoxication. 59 Finally, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate
ished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering.

Id. § 2A:15-5.1.
According to this act, the damages granted to the plaintiff will be diminished
by the plaintiffs percentage of fault. Therefore, if the fact finder determines that
the relative fault of the defendant was 51% or more, the plaintiff may still recover
damages. See Nanovic, supra note 15, at 244-47 (detailing Buckley and interaction of
New Jersey's dram shop rule and its Comparative Negligence Act).
57. Buckley, 500 A.2d at 704. A tavern could reduce its liability if it could
demonstrate that the plaintiff had the capacity to appreciate the risk associated
with engaging in the activity that led to the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 709. But if the
tavern served the plaintiff alcohol when he or she was visibly intoxicated, and the
patron's intoxicated state rendered him or her unable to take self-protective measures, the tavern could not benefit from the defense of comparative negligence. Id.
at 708.
58. 603 A.2d 503, 510 (NJ. 1992).
59. Id. In Lee, three business associates went to the Kiku Restaurant after work
and drank heavily. Id. at 504. When all three were intoxicated, they decided to
leave the restaurant and get into a vehicle to drive home. Id. About five miles
from the restaurant the intoxicated driver hit a truck from the rear and the three
occupants suffered serious injury. Id. One of the passengers filed suit against the
driver and the Kiku Restaurant, alleging that the restaurant was liable because it
had served alcohol to the driver while he was visibly intoxicated. Id. The court
was forced to redefine the legal principles that govern the apportionment of fault
between a dram shop and its intoxicated patrons. Id. at 505.
The court noted that the majority of states, whether completely insulating a
tavern from liability or premising dram shop liability on negligence or strict liability principles, view a customer who drinks to the point of intoxication as at least
partially responsible for the consequences of his or her conduct. Id. at 507; see
Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 11-12 (Cal. 1981) (rendering voluntary consumption
of alcohol sole proximate cause of patron's injury); Sheehy v. Big Flats Community
Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 22-23 (N.Y. 1989) (deciding that party injured by voluntary consumption of liquor did not have cause of action against provider of alcohol); Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that intoxicated patron must be held to standard of reasonably prudent
sober person); see alsoJulius F. Lang, Jr. & John J. McGrath, Comment, Third Party
Liabilityfor Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road" Becomes One for the Courts, 29
ViL. L. REv. 1119 (1984) (examining dram shop liability throughout the United
States); James R. Myers, Comment, Dramshop Liability: The Blurry Status of Drinking
Companions, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1153 (1990) (discussing strict liability dram shop
statutes and complicity defense); Nanovic, supra note 15, at 239-49 (explaining
comparative negligence and dram shop liability schemes).
The court also commented that most states that apply comparative negligence
in dram shop actions allow the tavern to assert the defense against a plaintiff who
has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication. Lee, 603 A.2d at
508; see Del E. Webb Corp. v. Superior Court of Ariz., 726 P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz.
1986) (stating that self-intoxication makes person at least partially responsible for
injuries); Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Colo. 1989) (same); O'Hanley v.
Ninety-Nine, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 1217, 1219-20 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (same);
Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213, 218-19 (Miss. 1979) (same); Bissett v.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 10

1266

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 1255

Division has concluded that liability is limited to those who owe a duty to
prevent drunk driving. 60 The court concluded that passengers in a vehicle
do not owe a duty to third parties to prevent the driver of the vehicle from
61
driving while intoxicated.
DMI, Inc., 717 P.2d 545, 547 (Mont. 1986) (same); Baxter v. Noce, 752 P.2d 240,
244 (N.M. 1988) (same); Tome, 446 N.E.2d at 853 (same); Barrie v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd., 586 A.2d 1017, 1019-20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (same); Young
v. Caravan Corp., 663 P.2d 834, 838 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (same). In addition,
some states with dram shop acts do not allow a patron who drinks to the point of
intoxication and subsequently injures him or herself to recover from the tavern for
the injuries under the state's dram shop act. Lee, 603 A.2d at 508; see Weeks v.
Princeton's, 570 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Ala. 1990) (stating that the intoxicated person
is not protected party under Alabama's Dram Shop Act); Jodelis v. Harris, 517
N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Ill. 1987) (concluding that dram shops are not exposed to any
liability under Illinois's Dram Shop Act for intoxicated patrons who suffer injuries
as result of their own intoxication); Ciemierek v. Jim's Garage, 282 N.W.2d 396,
398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that under Michigan's Dram Shop Act intoxicated individual has no right of action against bar). Some courts have allowed a
complicity defense against a plaintiff who actively contributed to or participated in
the intoxication of a patron who later caused plaintiffs injury. See Sterenberg v. Sir
Loin, Inc., 539 N.E.2d 294, 297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (denying recovery to third
party injured by intoxicated patron because party "willingly participated" in patron's drinking activities); Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 360 (Iowa 1989)
(allowing tavern to assert defenses of complicity and assumption of risk against
injured third party); Craig v. Larson, 439 N.W.2d 899, 904 (Mich. 1989) (barring
third party from recovery because he actively participated in patron's intoxication
by buying him drinks); Spragg v. Shuster, 398 N.W.2d 683, 685-88 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that active participation in patron's drinking precludes recovery).
Keeping all of this case law in mind, the NewJersey Supreme Court held in Lee
that the public interest in deterring drinking to the point of intoxication and the
principles of comparative negligence are consistent with allowing juries to consider the fault of a patron in voluntarily drinking to the point of intoxication. Lee,
603 A.2d at 509.
60. Lombardo v. Hoag, 634 A.2d 550, 559 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). In
this case, several individuals were driving while drinking alcohol. Id. at 552. After
making several stops, the keys for the vehicle were turned over to Edward Hoag.
Id. at 553. Hoag was described by one of the passengers as "visibly intoxicated" and
"unfit to drive." Id. No one ever told Hoag, however, that he appeared drunk or
that he was unfit to drive. Id. 553-54. Nonetheless, Hoag began to drive the vehicle and was only driving for approximately three to five minutes when an accident
occurred. Id. As a result of this collision, one of the passengers, Lombardo, suffered severe damage to his spine. Id. at 554. Lombardo brought a negligence
action against Hoag and some of the passengers in the vehicle, claiming that these
passengers had a duty to prevent Hoag from driving while intoxicated. Id. at 552.
61. Id. The court held that extending a duty beyond the duty already imposed on a passenger, to refrain from interfering with a driver's operation of a
vehicle and refusing to ride in a vehicle whose driver is known to be intoxicated,
would create a broad standard that would apply to "everybody in the planet who
happens to be in a position of stopping Hoag from driving having determined he
was drunk." Id. at 559. According to the court, this duty is so broad that it could
conceivably apply to "gas station attendants, toll booth operators, parking lot attendents, repair servicers, and onlookers who may have observed the participants
get into a vehicle with an intoxicated person." Id. In addition, this "over-broad
duty would open a Pandora's Box of potential liability and responsibility
problems." Id.
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THE APPLICABILITY OF NEW JERSEY DRAM SHOP LAW TO
CASINO LIABILITY

Like the selling and serving of alcohol, gambling in New Jersey has a
long history of regulation. 62 In fact, New Jersey's gambling industry is
even more pervasively regulated by the Casino Control Act than its alcohol
industry. 63 Presumably, the fundamental reason for extensive regulation
64
of these industries is the same: protecting the public from injury.
62. Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D.NJ.
1993), affd on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994). In 1844, New Jersey
adopted a constitution that made lotteries unlawful. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 2.
"That section of the constitution was amended in 1897 and again in 1939 to encompass additional forms of gambling, including 'roulette... game[s] of chance
of any form ... pool-selling, book-making, or gambling of any kind .... '" Tose,
819 F. Supp. at 1318 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 2) (alterations in original);
see also State v. Rucker, 134 A.2d 409, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (discussing New Jersey's constitutional prohibitions on gambling). In New Jersey's 1947
Constitution, the State again incorporated a general ban on "gambling of any
kind." Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1318 (citing N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 2). In 1976,
however, NewJersey made casino gambling legal within Atlantic City. Id. at 1319;
see N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, 1 2(D); see also Knight v. City of Margate, 431 A.2d 833,
836 (1981) (discussing constitutional amendment). In 1976, the NewJersey Legislature responded to this constitutional amendment by comprehensively regulating
all gambling and casinos under the Casino Control Act. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1319
(discussing NewJersey's Casino Control Act found at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to 190 (West 1996)).
63. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to -210. The New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated:
[T]he Casino Control Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1977 to authorize casino gaming and establish the regulatory framework for the casino industry. The statutory and administrative controls over casino
operations established by the Act are extraordinary pervasive and intensive. Over 11 statutory articles and almost 200 separate provisions cover
virtually every facet of casino gambling and its potential impact upon the
public. The regulatory scheme is both comprehensive and minutely
elaborate.
Knight, 431 A.2d at 836 (citations omitted).
"Casino gambling has been legal in NewJersey... since 1977, and the casino
industry in New Jersey is purely a creature of statute." Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj
Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 633 (D.N.J. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.
1995). "[C] asino gambling... is an activity where the respective rights and obligations of persons engaged in this activity have been articulated and developed by
statutes and regulations." Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1317 n.8. Judge Irenas noted in
Tose:
Considering the breadth of areas covered by statute and regulation,
it would seem that if it were indeed the public policy of New Jersey to
impose liability on casinos for allowing intoxicated patrons to gamble,
that policy would have been enacted. The State has regulated the minu-

tiae of gaming rules and alcohol service and expressly permitted the serving of free drinks to patrons at the gambling tables. Surely it could not
have been unaware that the cognitive functioning of many gamblers
would be impaired by drinking or of the consequences of permitting persons so impaired to gamble.
Id.
64. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 632. "The emphasis of dram shop liability is
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The relevant question is whether dram shop liability is applicable to
casinos that allow intoxicated patrons to gamble and continue to serve
them alcoholic beverages after they are visibly intoxicated. 65 At first
glance, dram shop liability seems to be applicable to casinos. When a tavern serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron and allows him or her to
drive home, causing physical injury in an automobile accident, the tavern
may be liable for these injuries. Similarly, when a casino serves alcohol to
a visibly intoxicated gambling patron and allows him or her to continue
gambling, the patron suffers economic injury. The policy behind dram
shop liability is the protection of innocent victims and intoxicated patrons
from injury or property damage caused by the alcohol server's
66
negligence.
It is important to note that the New Jersey courts have only extended
67
tort liability to economic injury in a limited number of circumstances.
The general rule in tort law is that tort liability does not extend to purely
economic injury. 6 8 Therefore, because the patron's loss in the casino scenario is purely economic, dram shop liability is not perfectly applicable to
casinos. 69 Furthermore, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey has stated that the New Jersey courts have not extended dram
shop liability beyond injuries related to drunken driving, barroom accidents and barroom brawls. 70 NewJersey has also recognized that an intoxprotecting innocent victims from the effects of the alcohol server's negligence." Id.
(citing Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (NJ. 1959)).
65. See, e.g., Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 629. In Hakimoglu, Mr. Hakimoglu
contends that the casino "continuously" provided him with free alcoholic beverages even beyond the point at which he was "visibly and substantially intoxicated."
Id. Mr. Hakimoglu contended that as a result of the casino allowing him to gamble
while visibly intoxicated, he sustained gambling losses in excess of $2,000,000. Id.
66. Id. at 632.
67. GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has recognized that a tortfeasor "may be liable for all proximately
caused harm, including economic losses." Id. at 656 (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. 1985)). The New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
"[A] defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid
the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs.., to whom defendant knows or has reason to know are
likely to suffer such damages from its conduct. A defendant failing to
adhere to this duty of care may be found liable for such economic damages proximately caused by its breath of duty."
Id. (quoting People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 115) (alteration in original).
68. Hallam, supra note 2, at 254 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). "The
general rule in tort law is that a plaintiff may not recover pure economic loss that is
unaccompanied by personal injury or physical destruction of property." Id.
69. Id. "Dram shop law.. is not an exact analogy [to a casino allowing an
intoxicated patron to gamble] . . . because existing dram shop law only involves

damage to person or property. The gambler's loss, in contrast, is purely economic." Id. at 253; see also Mario Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 285 (1982) (discussing economic loss in tort).

70. Griesenbeck v. Walker, 488 A.2d 1038, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985).
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icated patron may not avoid complete responsibility for injuries
proximately caused by his or her voluntary decision to drink to the point
71
of intoxication.
Those advocating finding casinos liable for allowing patrons to gamble while intoxicated contend that "New Jersey has unambiguously communicated a strong public policy against the noxious potential of excessive
alcohol consumption." 72 Therefore, the public policy behind prohibiting
a tavern owner from serving an intoxicated patron is equally strong in ap73
plication to a casino serving alcohol to an intoxicated gambling patron.
Additionally, proponents have noted that both Nevada and New Jersey,
the states in which gambling cases are most likely to occur, have adopted
comparative fault statutes.7 4 Comparative fault allows a plaintiff to recover
75
damages even if the plaintiff was more negligent than the defendant.
Consequently, even though a casino patron may be considered negligent
for continuing to gamble while intoxicated, or for drinking to the point of
71. Lee v. Kiku Restaurant, 603 A.2d 503, 509 (N.J. 1992). For further discussion of the holding in Lee, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
72. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. at 653. For further discussion of the Aboud decision,
see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 652-53. The Aboud court reasoned that whether or not a casino
should be liable under dram shop law turned on the question of whether or not
the casino owed the gambling patron a duty. Id. at 652. The court noted that:
"[I]n order to ascertain the existence ... of a duty owed by a defendant,
it is necessary to determine whether or not probable harm to one in the
position of the injured plaintiff should reasonably have been anticipated
from defendant's conduct. Thus, the issue of duty owed to a plaintiff is a
question of foreseeability."
Id. (quoting DiCosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (NJ. 1982)) (alteration in original). Additionally, the court noted that "'[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a
question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the
parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution."'
Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962)).
Therefore, the court concluded that "imposing a duty upon a casino to act reasonably under the circumstances and prevent obviously intoxicated patrons from gambling ... merely further[s] the public policy goals ... which is the protection of
gambling patrons from the deleterious effects of alcohol imbibement." Id. at 654.
74. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3
(West 1987).
75. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 478-79 (4th ed.
1994). There are various types of comparative fault regimes. Id. Under a "pure"
comparative fault plan, a plaintiff who is more at fault than the defendant may still
recover for the proportion of damages that is caused by the defendant's fault. Id.
Another form of comparative fault regime is "modified" comparative fault. Id. According to the "modified" comparative fault theory:
[A] plaintiff who is less than 100 percent at fault may be precluded from
recovering. There are two principal forms of modified comparative fault.
Under some systems, the bar exists only if the negligence of the plaintiff
exceeds that of the defendant. Under both systems, if the plaintiff's negligence has not reached the cut-off point, the recovery is reduced
proportionately.
Id. at 479.
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intoxication, New Jersey law provides that the casino could still be found
76
negligent and liable for damages.
IV.

THE APPROACH IN HAI1MOGLU V.

TRUMP

TAiMAHAL ASSOCIATES

In Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates,77 the plaintiff asserted
that the defendants, two Atlantic City casinos, had enticed him to gamble
on many occasions by giving him free alcohol, that during the time he
gambled he was constantly served free alcohol and that even after he became "visibly and obviously intoxicated," he was allowed to continue gambling, causing him to incur substantial economic losses. 78 Hakimoglu
claimed that the casino's conduct constituted negligence, intentional and
malicious conduct, and resulted in unjust enrichment. 79 Although
Hakimoglu's complaint contained these three counts, Hakimoglu collapsed these potential claims into a single claim under the theory of dram
shop liability. 80 Hakimoglu filed two separate actions in the United States
81
District Court for the District of New Jersey.
The district court dismissed Hakimoglu's claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 82 The court predicted that the
76. Hallam, supra note 2, at 248-49. "[I]t is likely that an intoxicated gambler's contributory negligence would reduce but not completely bar his recovery
against a casino." Id.
77. 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).

78. Id. at 292. The Taj Mahal Casino provided Hakimoglu With free alcohol
in his hotel room and he was "continuously provided with complimentary 4-5
ounce . . . martinis during the entire period he [was] gambling." Hakimoglu v.
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D.N.J. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 291
(3d Cir. 1995). The casino continued to provide a "stream" of alcohol to
Hakimoglu after he was visibly and substantially intoxicated. Id.
Hakimoglu "allegedly sustained gambling losses in excess of $2,000,000 while
[he was] visibly intoxicated." Id. This amount included losses that Hakimoglu incurred because the casinos extended him additional credit by permitting him to
draw markers against his credit account while he was intoxicated. Id.
79. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 627.
80. Id. at 629 n.2. The court found:
Mr. Hakimoglu's claim does not challenge any rule or regulation nor is it
an implied cause of action from any rule or regulation of the Division of

Alcoholic Beverage Control or Casino Control Commission. Rather, Mr.
Hakimoglu's claim is based on New Jersey common law liability which
provides that a tavern keeper who serves alcoholic beverages when he
knows or should have known that the patron is intoxicated may properly
be found to have created an unreasonable risk of harm and may be liable
for the injuries which result from that conduct.
Id. (citation omitted). The court further stated: "Mr. Hakimoglu's claims are
based on common law liability for the serving of alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons. This liability has existed in New Jersey since 1959 [under Rappaport]." Id.
81. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 292. Hakimoglu filed claims against Trump Taj

Mahal Associates and the Boardwalk Regency Corporation. Id. The federal court
had jurisdiction over this case based upon diversity of citizenship. Hakimoglu, 876
F. Supp. at 629. Therefore, the federal court must apply the substantive law of the
State of New Jersey. Id. (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
82. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 627.
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Supreme Court of NewJersey would not recognize a common law cause of
action based on the application of dram shop law to casinos. 83 In arriving
at this conclusion, the district court examined the decisions of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Third Circuit and
84
the New Jersey intermediate appellate courts.
83. Id. at 628. The district court acknowledged that the NewJersey Supreme
Court is a "national leader among the states in developing and refining the common law." Id. at 636. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373, 380 (NJ.
1994) (expanding bystander liability to include fiancee); Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo
Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1120 (NJ. 1993) (imposing duty of care for safety of visitors to open houses); Lee v. Kiku Restaurant, 603 A.2d 503, 509-10 (N.J. 1992)
(holding that intoxicated patron's comparative negligence can be considered in
measuring damages); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1251
(N.J. 1991) (recognizing cause of action by owner of contaminated property
against previous owner who allegedly caused contamination); Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc., 218 A.2d 630, 633 (NJ. 1960) (extending dram shop liability to
patron's own injuries); Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (NJ. 1959) (holding
tavern liable for injuries where tavern served alcohol to minor and minor subsequently operated a motor vehicle, causing fatal accident).
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held, however,
that the NewJersey Supreme Court would not extend the dram shop liability doctrine to the case at bar for several reasons. First, a "high-stakes [gambler] has no
inhibition about gambling." Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 636. "If continued gambling.., is the conduct for which alcohol removes inhibitions and enhances risks,
the alcohol is overcoming inhibitions of one who did not have any to begin
with ....
Id. Second, the analogy to the foreseeability of the harm is absent for
casinos. Id. "(TJhe tavern patron does not seek to have an automobile accident
...while the casino patron certainly seeks to engage in gambling, knowing its rules
and its risks." Id. Third, many casino games require little or no particular skill,
whereas in a dram shop situation the risk of harm is substantially increased by
serving more alcohol to an intoxicated patron. Id. Fourth, extending a dram shop
cause of action to gambling losses would create difficult proximate causation
problems. Id. Fifth, allowing such a cause of action would open the floodgates of
litigation and create a substantial risk of fraudulent claims. Id. at 637. Sixth, the
casino industry is already highly regulated, deterring misconduct by casinos in
their service of alcohol to patrons. Id.; see Lomonaco v. Sands Hotel Casino and
Country Club, 614 A.2d 634, 637-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding that
Casino Control Act does not abrogate traditional common law defenses, such as
incapacity). Finally, the court noted that there is no evidence of any policy of the
Casino Control Commission "to refund such gaming losses allegedly incurred by
an intoxicated patron at any time in sixteen years of casino gambling in New
Jersey, notwithstanding a regulatory scheme that is pervasive and strict."
Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 637.
84. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 629. The district court noted that because the
court had jurisdiction in this case based upon diversity of citizenship, the substantive law of the State of New Jersey must be applied to the case. Id. See generally Erie
RR, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."). Because the NewJersey Supreme Court had not yet addressed this issue, however, the
district court "must be governed by a prediction of how the state's highest court
would decide were it confronted with the problem." Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at
629 (citing McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir. 1980)). In
turn, "the Third Circuit has indicated that in the absence of a pronouncement on
the issue by the state's highest court, decisions by the intermediate appellate courts
must be given serious consideration in ascertaining and applying state law." Id.
(citing Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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Does the Casino Control Act Allow an Implied PrivateRight of Action?

Initially, the district court attempted to determine whether the Casino
Control Act allows a private right of action. 85 The court examined GNOC
Corp. v. Aboud,86 in which the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey predicted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would imply, from provisions of the Casino Control Act, that "a casino has a duty to
refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble when that patron
is obviously and visibly intoxicated and/or under the influence of a narcotic substance." 87 The court recognized, however, the opinion in Miller
Even the lower New Jersey courts, however, had not yet addressed this issue. Id.
Therefore, the United States District Court for the District of NewJersey looked to
its own prior decisions and a decision of the Third Circuit in deciding this case. Id.
85. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 630.
86. 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989).
87. Id. at 655. In this case, Mr. Aboud went to the Golden Nugget Casino in
Atlantic City with several of his friends after receiving a $395,000 settlement from
an automobile accident. Id. at 646-47. By leaving a $10,000 deposit with the casino, Aboud was granted complimentary lodging during his stay. Id. In addition,
Aboud was made eligible for "comping," a practice whereby the casino supplies a
gambling patron with complimentary food, beverages and alcohol based upon the
gambler's "level of casino play." Id. Aboud also received medical assistance during
his stay at the casino and was given a prescription for Percodan by the casino's
physician. Id. Aboud lost a large amount of money while gambling at the Golden
Nugget and "the Golden Nugget initiated [a] lawsuit against Mr. Aboud to recover
a $28,000 debt for casino credits, which Aboud was unable to repay." Id. at 648.
Aboud counterclaimed against the casino for $250,000, alleging fraud and malicious conduct, unjust enrichment, and negligence. Id. Aboud contended:
As a result of the Percodan which had been supplied by the doctors on
call with the Golden Nugget, and the alcoholic beverages which were being provided by various employees and personnel of the Golden Nugget,
Mr. Aboud was caused to become sleepy, drowsy, disoriented and handicapped in his ability to reason and comprehend .... While in such a
disoriented state, Mr. Aboud was caused to gamble and lose to the
Golden Nugget an amount in excess of $225,000.00.
Id.
The Aboud court first determined that the casino did owe a duty to Aboud to
protect him from unreasonable and foreseeable risks. Id. at 651-52. The court
concluded:
New Jersey has unambiguously communicated a strong public policy
against the noxious potential of excessive alcohol consumption in the
twin contexts of common law dram shop liability and statutory/administrative regulation of casino alcoholic beverage service. In so doing, New
Jersey... has issued a clear statement about the foreseeability and reasonableness of intoxication related risk and harm.
Id. at 653. Additionally, the court examined the Casino Control Act which explicitly proscribes a casino from making alcoholic beverages available to a patron at a
gaming table "'unless so requested by the patron."' Id. (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 5:12-103(g) (1) (West 1996)). The statute also makes it a violation for any holder
of a Casino Hotel Alcoholic Beverage License to: "1. Serve, or allow, permit or
suffer the service of alcoholic beverages, to [any person actually or apparently intoxicated]; or 2. Allow, permit, or suffer the consumption of any alcoholic beverage in or upon the licensed premise by such person." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19&

§ 50-2.2(g) (1996). The court concluded that:
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v. Zoby, 88 which concluded that because the Casino Control Act is so comprehensive, absent express legislative intent, there is no private cause of
action under the Act.89 The district court concluded that the holding in
Miller undermined a major premise of Aboud.9°
Finally, the district court examined its prior holding in Tose v. Greate
Bay Hotel and Casino Inc.9 1 In Tose, the district court examined whether a
By imposing a duty upon a casino to act reasonably under the circumstances and prevent obviously intoxicated patrons from gambling, we are
merely furthering the public policy goals underlying the Casino Control
Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder, which is the protection
of gambling patrons from the deleterious effects of alcohol imbibement.
Aboud, 715 F. Supp. at 654. Therefore, the court held that "a casino has a duty to
refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble where that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated and/or under the influence of a narcotic substance."
Id. at 655.
Interestingly, the court noted that the effects of alcohol on reasoning and
judgment are "not lost" on casinos who make alcohol readily and complimentarily
available to patrons while they are gambling. Id. at 656.
88. 595 A.2d 1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
89. Id. In this case, Roland Zoby was a 'junket operator" with a license from
the Casino Control Commission. Id. A 'junket" is:
An arrangement the purpose of which is to induce any person, selected
or approved for participation therein on the basis of his ability to satisfy a
financial qualification obligation related to his ability or willingness to
gamble or on any other basis related to his propensity to gamble, to come
to a licensed casino hotel for the purpose of gambling and pursuant to
which, and as consideration for which, any and all of the cost of transportation, food, lodging, and entertainment for said person is directly or indirectly paid by a casino licensee or employee or agent thereof.
Id. at 1104-05 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-29). Zoby went on several junkets with
Albert Miller, a widower and a compulsive gambler. Id. at 1105. Miller wrote personal and business checks to Zoby who advanced or loaned him cash. Id. Plaintiffs
contended that these loans were for gambling. Id. Upon Miller's death, he still
owed $76,000.00 to a corporation against which he had written the checks that
Zoby had endorsed and deposited. Id. The plaintiffs contended "that if Zoby had
not advanced Miller these funds, in violation of the NewJersey statutes and regulations, [Miller] would not have depleted his estate." Id.
The court based its decision on the fact that the Casino Control Act contains
no express provision allowing a civil suit for damages by a casino patron based on
violations of the Act's regulatory provisions. Id. at 1106. In examining the intent
of the legislature, the court also concluded that there was no legislative intent to
create a private right of action in favor of a gambler to recoup his or her losses. Id.
at 1109-10. In fact, the court concluded that the legislative intent seems to be to
the contrary. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that "[g]iven the pervasive
casino regulatory scheme, we find no basis to authorize, as a matter ofjudge-made
law, a new tort cause of action." Id. at 1110. "The Legislature has provided only
limited civil remedies in the Casino Control Act... and by implication we think no
more than those established by that Act were intended." Id.
90. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 630-31.
91. 819 F. Supp 1312 (D.N.J. 1993), affd, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994). In
Tose, the plaintiff claimed that he had lost over $3,000,000 while gambling between
1983 and 1987. Tose, 34 F.3d at 1228. Tose alleged that the casino had "intentionally and maliciously provided him with alcoholic beverages so that he would become intoxicated, continued to provide him with these beverages after he became
visibly intoxicated, and encouraged and allowed him to gamble while visibly intoxi-
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jury should be instructed on the defense of comparative negligence when

the casino had alleged that its liability should be reduced by the plaintiffs
own negligent conduct of drinking to the point of intoxication. 92 The
court pointed out that in the specific context of dram shop liability, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that "'a jury should apportion
fault between the patron and the tavern based on the extent to which each
party's negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries."' 9 3 Dram shop
cases are unusual because the defendant has a duty not to contribute to
cated." Id. at 1228-29. The casino filed suit to recover gambling debts from Mr.
Tose. Id. at 1228. Tose then filed a counterclaim to recover his gambling losses,
alleging that he was obviously and visibly intoxicated when he incurred these
losses. Id.
92. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1314. The court explained that "comparative negligence is an affirmative defense that a defendant can assert to reduce liability." Id.
According to NewJersey state law, "any damages attributable to a defendant's negligence 'shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable
to the person recovering,' so long as the plaintiff s negligence was not greater than
the defendant's." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1). Before adopting this
comparative fault doctrine, however, New Jersey followed a doctrine of contributory negligence. Id. According to the contributoy negligence doctrine, any negli-

gence by the plaintiff could bar all recovery. Id. (citing Soronen v. Olde Milford
Inn, Inc., 218 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1996)) (emphasis added). "A plaintiff is considered
contributorily negligent where '[h] is actions are such as to constitute a failure to
use such care for his safety as the ordinarily prudent man in similar circumstances
would use."' Id. (quoting Hendrikson v. Koppers Co., 95 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1953)).
"Both comparative and contributory negligence limit a plaintiff's recovery based
on that plaintiffs negligent act." Id.
The district court went on to note that the issue in a contributory negligence
situation "is whether the plaintiff was moving about in the world in a way that
posed an unreasonable risk of physical injury to herself." Id. at 1315. Additionally,
the court asserted that the NewJersey courts have placed a duty on individuals not
to expose themselves to unreasonable physical danger. Id. Futhermore, the court
noted that when an individual becomes voluntarily intoxicated she exposes herself
to an increased risk of moving about carelessly and putting herself in physical danger. Id. Consequently, "[v] oluntary intoxication.., undermines the policy of individual responsibility on which contributory and comparative negligence defenses
are based." Id. The court concluded that "[iit follows that in NewJersey, individuals are generally not excused from acting negligently if their voluntary intoxication
dulled their appreciation of the risk. Rather, an intoxicated person is held to the
same standard of care as a sober person." Id. The NewJersey Supreme Court has
stated, "'statutory and case law reflect the compelling public policy that those who
voluntarily become intoxicated must be held responsible for the consequences of

their behavior."' Id. (quoting Lee v. Kiku Restaurant, 603 A.2d 503 (N.J. 1992)).
93. Id. (quoting Lee, 603 A.2d at 503). The court noted that in Soronen the
NewJersey Supreme Court had held that a defendant tavern in a dram shop action
could not assert the patron's voluntary intoxication as a defense. Id. (citing
Soronen, 218 A.2d at 630). New Jersey's adoption of the comparative negligence
doctrine had modified Soronen, however, because under comparative negligence

the plaintiffs recovery against the defendant was not completely barred by the
plaintiffs own negligence. Id. For example, in a drunk driving situation a server
could assert a comparative negligence defense against an intoxicated driver "'to
the extent that the driver's act of drinking to the point of intoxication contributed
to his inability to drive carefully."' Id. (quoting Lee, 603 A.2d at 503).
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the individual's intoxication after a certain point. 94 The court concluded
that the holding of Aboud governed the holding in this case because "'a
casino has a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble where that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated.' 95 Judge
Irenas, who wrote the opinion in Tose, expressed reservations concerning
the allowance of a private cause of action in an area so pervasively controlled by legislative enactments.9 6 The district court went on to state that
the decisive issue in this case "is whether New Jersey imposes on a gambling patron a duty to protect herself from the financial injury which
might occur if she gambles while her mental facilities are impaired by alcohol."9 7 The district court concluded that the Casino Control Commission
is not vested with exclusive jurisdiction over gambling issues, and that a
94. Id. at 1316.
95. Id. (quoting GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 655 (D.N.J. 1989)).
The district court noted that there was no NewJersey state court authority placing
this liability on casinos, however, the court in Aboud analogized casino liability

under these circumstances to dram shop liability and found that liability in the
casino situation furthered the public policy "'of protect[ing] ...gambling patrons
from the deleterious effects of alcohol imbibement."' Id. (quoting Aboud, 715 F.
Supp. at 654).
96. Id. at 1316 n.8. Judge Rodriquez originally considered the decision in
Tose, however, upon Judge Rodriquez's decision not to reconsider Aboud, the case
was reassigned to Judge Irenas, who was bound by the prior decision of Judge
Rodriguez. Id. Nevertheless, Judge Irenas expressed reservations about this holding in a footnote to the case. Id. at 1317 n.8. Judge Irenas asserted that the cause
of action implicated by Judge Rodriguez's decision, and the holding of Aboud, contradict the general rule that private causes of action are not usually implied from
regulatory enactments without legislative intent. Id. Judge Irenas also pointed out
that the NewJersey Appellate Division had already ruled that even a casino's direct
violation of the Casino Control Act does not create a private right of action. Id.
(citing Miller v. Zoby, 595 A.2d 1104, 1109-10 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)). In
this case, Judge Irenas stated the case for an implied cause of action under the
Casino Control Act is even weaker because there is no direct regulation that prohibits a casino from allowing an intoxicated patron to gamble. Id. Additionally,
Judge Irenas noted that if it were truly the public policy of New Jersey to impose
liability on casinos for allowing patrons to gamble while intoxicated, the New

Jersey Legislature would have enacted it. Id.
97. Id. In other words, the court was attempting to determine if New Jersey

would recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence where a gambler loses

money at a casino while voluntarily intoxicated. Id.
The court noted that New Jersey has a long history of seeking to protect gamblers from their own weakness and foolishness. Id. Additionally, the New Jersey
Legislature did not clearly indicate any intention to impose on a gambler the duty
to avoid becoming intoxicated while gambling. Id. at 1319. Furthermore, the New
Jersey courts have regarded the temptation to gamble as an extremely powerful
one. Id. at 1318. Consequently, the court concluded that the restrictions which

the New Jersey Legislature has placed on gambling are intended to protect the
individual gambler, and society as a whole, from its potential harms. Id. The court
found, that given the historical backgound of New Jersey's restrictions on gambling, it could not be said that New Jersey has placed the burden of protection
from gambling losses on the gamblers themselves. Id. at 1319.

For further discussion of the history of NewJersey's statutory and public policy
restrictions on gambling, see supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
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cause of action may exist against a casino owner based on the negligent
sale of intoxicating liquor.98 This case was appealed to the Third Circuit,
where the district court's holding was affirmed.9 9
Because of the subsequent decision by the Third Circuit in Tose, the
district court in Hakimoglu invited supplemental briefing and oral argument to determine whether the Third Circuit's decision represented a
change in the law, such that it should reconsider its prediction that the
New Jersey Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for a
plaintiffs claim under the common law doctrine of dram shop liability. 10 0
After examining the supplemental briefing, the district court "remained
convinced that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not expand the com98. Id. The court also noted, however, that the Casino Control Act explicitly
permits casinos to serve alcoholic beverages at gaming tables upon request of the
patron. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-103(g)(1) (West 1996) (permitting service of
alcoholic beverages if requested). Beverages may also be served without cost to a
patron and his or her guests. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1319; see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12102(m)(1) (listing alcoholic beverage as item which may be given to patron).
There is also a regulation that forbids a casino from serving alcohol to a visibly and
obviously intoxicated patron. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1319; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
19K, § 50-2.2 (1996) (prohibiting serving intoxicated person); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13, § 2-23.1 (1996) (same). There is no regulation, however, that forbids the
casino from allowing an intoxicated patron to gamble, nor one that prohibits the
patron from gambling while in an intoxicated condition. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at
1320.
The court concluded that NewJersey "[cannot] apply comparative negligence
to a person who drinks, gambles, and loses. The public policies of New Jersey
condone, and in certain ways even encourage, drinking, gambling and losing in a
licensed casino." Id. at 1321.
99. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc. v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1232-35 (3d Cir.
1994) (affirming district court's holding that New Jersey Casino Control Commission did not have exclusive jurisdiction over gamblers' claims against casinos).
First, the Third Circuit concluded that the Casino Control Commission was not
vested with primary exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. Id. at 1235; see Abbott v.
Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 391 (N.J. 1985) (stating that "except in those cases where the
legislature vests exclusive primary jurisdiction in an agency, a plaintiff may seek
relief in our trial courts"); Lally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317, 1319 (NJ. 1981)
(holding that where legislature did not specify administrative agency's jurisdiction
as exclusive, administrative agency and courts had concurrent jurisdiction);
DeFazio v. Haven Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 126 A.2d 639, 643 (NJ. 1956) (recognizing
following principles of statutory construction: (1) statutory construction requires a
court "to determine the purpose and intent of the Legislature"; (2) courts should
presume that a statute does not intend to change common law or a common law
right; and (3) to overcome this presumption, "the legislative intent to do so must
be clearly and plainly expressed" (citations omitted)).
More importantly, however, the Third Circuit included in its opinion the remark that "while [it did] not make a ruling on the point, a reasonable argument
can be made that a casino owes a common law duty to a patron to prevent him
from gambling when it knows he is intoxicated." Tose, 34 F.3d at 1232 n.7 (citing
Aboud, 715 F. Supp. at 653).
100. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 628 (D.N.J.
1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d. Cir. 1995); see DisT N.J. CT. R. 12(1) (requiring that in
seeking reconsideration moving party must "set forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the [court] has overlooked").
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mon law doctrine of dram shop liability to include a cause of action for a
... gambler to recover gambling losses allegedly incurred when he was
intoxicated."' 0 1 This conclusion may have been strongly influenced by
the lengthy reservations that Judge Irenas expressed in Tose regarding the
10 2
extension of common law dram shop liability into the casino industry.
101. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 628. The district court concluded that the
Third Circuit's holding in Tose is "limited to a determination that the Casino Control Commission is not vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction over claims by a
gambler for losses incurred as the alleged result of the casino allowing him to
gamble while he is visibly and obviously intoxicated." Id. at 635. The Third Circuit
explicitly stated that it was not "mak[ing] a ruling on the point" of whether such a
claim constituted a valid cause of action under New Jersey common law. Id. (citing Tose, 34 F.3d at 1227). The district court went on to state that no common law
cause of action was implied by the Third Circuit's holding or comments in Tose.

Id.
The court explained that even though the Third Circuit, in Tose, held that the
New Jersey courts had concurrent jurisdiction over claims by a gambler for losses
incurred as the alleged result of the casino allowing him to gamble while he was
visibly and obviously intoxicated, a cause of action to regain such losses does not
exist. Id. "A statement that a court has subject matter jurisdiction implies nothing
more than the existence of judicial power to adjudicate a case; it says nothing
about the existence of a cause of action, that is, the identification or recognition
of a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id. Therefore, the district court
concluded that Tose did not imply recognition of a cause of action in favor of
Hakimoglu's claim against the defendant casinos. Id. In addition, the court concluded that Tose did not recognize a common law cause of action for Hakimoglu's
claim. Id. at 635-36.
102. Id. at 633. Judge Irenas stated that "'on close examination the superficial analogy between the dram shop case and [casino] cases breaks down in numerous particulars."' Id. (quoting Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1317 n.8). Judge Irenas
listed several reasons why this analogy fails:
(i) While there is clearly an overwhelming state policy against an intoxicated individual driving or engaging in any other activity which risks bodily injury or property damage, New Jersey at the very least condones
drinking while gambling.
(ii) With dram shop liability, and the related doctrine of social-host liability, the defendant's negligent act is serving alcohol. In this case, defendant's negligent "act" seems more like an omission-defendant has
failed to prevent plaintiff from engaging in a risky activity, gambling while
intoxicated.
(iii) In the context of a dram shop case the ability of a server of alcohol
to anticipate or prevent harm is somewhat limited. A bartender will often
not know whether a patron who leaves the bar is going to drive, and even
if she does, she will have very little if any ability to prevent the driving or
any subsequent calamity. A casino patron's gambling activity is always totally controlled by casino employees who are in a position to immediately
stop the gambling of any patron they know to be drunk.
(iv) In a typical dram shop case the harm being redressed is physical
injury or property damage, and there can be little doubt that New Jersey
public policy actively discourages conduct which leads to this kind of
harm. In an Aboud-type case the harm is loss at the gambling tables,
something the state as a general matter anticipates and on which it has
based a large and substantial industry. Nobody is encouraged in New
Jersey to go out and cause a "reasonable" amount of property damage
and personal injury. The same cannot be said about gambling losses.
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The Third Circuit also rejected Hakimoglu's tort claim of dram shop
liability, predominantly because of the pervasiveness of the Casino Control
Act and the lack of legislative intent to include tort recovery by intoxicated
patrons who lose money gambling. 10 3 Both the district court and the
Third Circuit concluded that it would be "naive" to believe that the legislature and the Casino Control Commission had overlooked the possibility of
(v) Although dram shop liability attaches even where the only harm
caused by an inebriate is to himself, there is a substantial risk that bodily
injury or other harm will result to innocent third parties, and the respective legal obligations of the server of alcohol and the drinker must be
considered in this light. For the most part a drunken gambler is a menace only to herself.
(vi) NewJersey's public policy over the years has been to protect gamblers from consequences of their own weakness and folly, either by banning gambling or by minutely regulating those who operate games of
chance. Public policy towards those who create the risk of personal injury
has been to make them legally responsible for their conduct, a liability
generally developed by common law courts rather than by legislation.
(vii) When allocating the respective obligations of the patron and the
server in a dram shop case, we must consider that the profit to the seller
of alcohol earned by serving a few drinks too many is relatively small. As
the allegations in this case demonstrate, letting a visibly and obviously
intoxicated high roller gamble for even a short period of time can yield
enormous profits to a casino.
Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1320-21 (footnotes omitted). In reference to the holding in
Aboud and the extension of dram shop liability to gambling issues, Judge Irenas
commented:
If one argues that Aboud is justified as a predictable extension of traditional common law principles, we are faced with the simple fact that casino gambling, which only became legal in 1977, is an activity where the
respective rights and obligations of persons engaged in this activity have
been articulated and developed by statutes and regulation, not by the
common law. In contrast, dram shop liability... springs from two areas
traditionally left to the common law, personal injuries and automobile
driving.
Id. at 1316 n.7.
103. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294. Although the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, it did not see the need to "engage in a lengthy discussion"
because the chief arguments on both sides of the issue were laid out in the district
court's opinion. Id. at 293.
The Third Circuit stated that "' [e]xtending common law dram shop liability
into an area so fully regulated, without a glimmer of legislative intent, is not a
predictable extension of common law tort principles, and has not been foreshadowed by the New Jersey courts."' Id. (quoting Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 633).
Additionally, the court noted:
Considering the breadth of areas covered by statute and regulation, it
would seem that if it were indeed the public policy of New Jersey to impose liability on casinos for allowing intoxicated patrons to gamble, that
policy would have been enacted. The State has regulated the minutiae of
gaming rules and alcohol service and expressly permitted the serving of
free drinks to patrons at the gambling tables. Surely it could not have
been unaware that the cognitive functioning of many gamblers would be
impaired by drinking or of the consequences of permitting persons so
impaired to gamble.
Id. at 294 (citing Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1317 n.8).
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this type of action.10 4 Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that it
seems more likely that the NewJersey Supreme Court would not recognize
claims by gambling patrons against casinos for losses sustained while the
10 5
patron was visibly intoxicated.
B.

Does Contract Law Apply?

The complaint which Hakimoglu filed against the casino alleged the
common law tort actions of negligence, intentional and malicious conduct, and unjust enrichment, which were collapsed into a single claim of
dram shop liability. 10 6 Although Hakimoglu's dram shop liability theory
relied upon tort principle, the district court discussed the distinction be10 7
tween an action in tort and an action in contract.
As stated earlier, both the district court and the Third Circuit rejected
Hakimoglu's tort action of dram shop liability, predominately because of
the pervasiveness of the Casino Control Act and the lack of legislative intent to include tort recovery by intoxicated patrons who lose money gambling.10 8 Simply because an area of the law is highly regulated, however,
does not abrogate common law contract defenses.1 0 9 Although
Hakimoglu did not assert a contract theory, the district court noted that
the intoxicated gambler could argue that he or she lacked the requisite
capacity to enter into a gambling contract.1 1 0 "[T]he Law Division of the
104. Id. The district court noted that "'[c]onsidering the breadth of areas
covered by statute and regulation, it would seem that if it were indeed the public
policy of New Jersey to impose liability on casinos for allowing intoxicated patrons
to gamble, that policy would have been enacted."' Id. (quoting Tose, 819 F. Supp.
at 1317 n.8).
105. Id.
106. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 629 n.2.
107. Id. at 633-34.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 634. For example, if a casino came to court to enforce a contractual debt against a gambling patron, the patron could "raise all the common law
defenses to a contract, including that his capacity to contract was impaired by voluntary intoxication." Id. at 633; see Feighner v. Sauter, 614 A.2d 1071, 1075 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (listing grounds for contract rescission, including

intoxication).
110. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 633 n.7. Under a contract theory, it must first
be determined that each bet between a gambling patron and a casino forms an
implied contract. Hallam, supra note 2, at 256-57. A contract entered into by a
person who is so intoxicated that he or she does not understand the nature and
consequences of his or her actions is void. Id. at 257; seeJohnson v. Harmon, 94
U.S. 371, 380 (1877) ("When intoxication goes so far as absolutely to destroy the
reason, it is evident that it renders the person in that state incapable of contracting
so long as it continues, since it renders him incapable of giving consent."). Therefore, a gambler could attempt to recover his losses from a casino by asserting that
his intoxication hindered his ability to understand the consequences of his actions,
voiding all bets which he placed while intoxicated. Hallam, supra note 2, at 257.
Judge Irenas noted in Tose, that one could view the transaction between a

casino and a gambling patron as a transaction in which the placing and acceptance
of a bet creates a contract. Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp.
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Superior Court of New Jersey has held that traditional common law con1 11
tract defenses [have not been] abrogated by the Casino Control Act."
The district court in Hakimoglu, however, stated that the contract analogy to the relationship between a casino and a gambling patron falls short
because the gambling relationship lacks mutuality. 112 In Tose, Judge
Irenas also pointed out that freedom to contract was greatly diminished by
the highly regulated relationship between the casino and the gambling
11 3
patron.
C. Problems With Proximate Causation
Finally, the Third Circuit and the district court were influenced by the
difficult problems of proof and causation that would result from recogni11 4
tion of claims such as Hakimoglu's.
Enlargement of [the doctrine of dram shop liability] to casino
gambling losses could present almost metaphysical problems of
proximate causation, since sober gamblers can play well yet lose
big, intoxicated gamblers can still win big, and under the prevailing rules and house odds, "the house will win and the gamblers
will lose" anyway in the typical transaction. 115
Additionally, some courts have denied recovery to intoxicated patrons, holding that the patron's consumption of alcohol is the proximate
cause of any harm. 116 According to this theory, gambling establishments
1312, 1317 n.8 (D.N.J. 1993), affid, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994). The intoxicated
plaintiff's ability to enter a contract could then be examined. Id.
111. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 634 (citing Lomonaco v. Sands Hotel Casino
and Country Club, 614 A.2d 634 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992)).
In Lomonaco, a gambler sued a casino contending that the casino markers
signed by the gambler were void because the gambler signed them under duress.
Lomonaco, 614 A.2d at 635. The court concluded that no part of the Casino Control Act states that defenses such as duress cannot be asserted to void a contractual
debt between a casino and a gambling patron. Id. at 637-38. Therefore, the court
concluded, "the common law contract defenses of incapacity, duress, and unconscionability still exist." Id. at 638.
112. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 633 n.7. The court points out that the gambling patron is not able to negotiate the terms of his "contract" or relationship with
the casino. Id. The patron is also not able to change the game rules, odds or
payoffs. Id. Instead, all of these terms are established by NewJersey's Casino Control Commission. Id.
113. Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1317 n.8. The court commented:
[B]ecause every aspect of the relationship between the gambler and the
casino is minutely regulated by the state and there is little freedom of
contract in the usual sense, there seems to be at least significant doubt
that the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize obligations not specifically called for by the statute or regulations.
Id.

114. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1995).
115. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 636 (quoting Greate Bay Hotel and Casino v.
Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1233 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)).
116. Hallam, supra note 2 at 250.
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could attempt to defeat claims by intoxicated gambling patrons attempting to recoup losses sustained while the patron was voluntarily intoxicated. 117 New Jersey dram shop law supports finding both the server, and
possibly the patron, the proximate cause of any subsequent injury and,
118
therefore, liable for any subsequent injury.
D.

Judge Becker's Dissent

Judge Becker begins his dissent in Hakimoglu by noting that New
Jersey law often recognizes new causes of action even in areas saturated by
legislation. 1 9 "I believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action, in tort, allowing patrons to recover gambling debts
120
from casinos that serve them alcohol after they are visibly intoxicated."
117. Id. at 251.
118. See Lee v. Kiku Restaurant, 603 A.2d 503, 511 (N.J. 1992) (holding that
negligent server and patron were both proximate causes of subsequent injury);
Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1959) (holding that tavern's service of
alcohol to intoxicated patron was proximate cause of subsequent injuries).
119. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294-95 (Becker, J., dissenting). The New Jersey
Supreme Court is a leader in expanding tort liability. Id. at 295 (Becker,J., dissenting); see Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373, 380 (N.J. 1994) (expanding bystander liability to include fiancee); Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d
1110, 1120 (N.J. 1993) (imposing duty of care for safety of visitors to open houses);
T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1251 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing cause of action by owner of contaminated property against previous owner who
allegedly caused contamination); Weinberg v. Dinger, 524 A.2d 366, 367 (N.J.
1987) (imposing duty of care on water companies to ensure adequate water pressure for firefighters); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 89 (N.J.
1960) (providing basis for doctrine of strict liability for automobiles). The New
Jersey Supreme Court has also consistently imposed liability on providers of alcohol for foreseeable drinking related injuries. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 295; see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-5(a) (West 1987) (allowing person served alcohol while intoxicated to sue tavern for damages to his or her car); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d
1219, 1222-23 (N.J. 1984) (extending dram shop liability to social hosts); Linn v.
Rand, 356 A.2d 15, 17-18 (NJ. 1976) (same); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc.,
218 A.2d 630, 633 (N.J. 1966) (extending dram shop liability to patron's own injuries); Rappaport,156 A.2d at 10 (recognizing action for death and damages against
tavern that sold alcohol to minor).
120. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294 (Becker, J., dissenting). "In Hopkins v. Fox &
Lazo Realtors ... the New Jersey Supreme Court set out its standard for determin-

ing when a tort duty, and thus a cause of action in negligence, exists." Id. at 296
(Becker, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). This standard requires the court to examine "(1) the relationship of the parties; (2) the nature of the risk; (3) the opportunity and ability to exercise care; and (4) the public interest in the proposed
solution." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Hopkins, 625 A.2d at 1116). Applying
these factors to Hakimoglu's asserted cause of action, Judge Becker concluded: (1)
the casino and the gambler are "linked in an immediate business relationship
much like that from which dram shop liability sprang-the tavern and the patron";
(2) losses due to alcohol consumption are foreseeable; (3) casino operators can
easily protect themselves against this kind of liability; and (4) public interest in
regulating gambling also supports allowing this type of action. Id. at 296-98
(Becker, J., dissenting).
In addition,Judge Becker noted that allocative economic torts (in which society is no worse off because different parties just possess the wealth) are recognized
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Because this is an area where a defendant profits from conduct causing a
foreseeable injury, and the defendant has the ability to prevent such injury
at a small cost to itself, Judge Becker concluded that the New Jersey
Supreme Court is especially likely to recognize Hakimoglu's cause of
action.

12 1

Judge Becker stated that both of the New Jersey cases that have addressed this issue recognized a cause of action. 122 Additionally, according
to Judge Becker, the two main arguments of the majority were incorrect. 123 First, Judge Becker disagreed with the majority's opinion that the
Appellate Division's decision in Miller v. Zoby 12 4 undermined the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Aboud. 125 According to Becker, Zoby
was based on an implied cause of action under the Casino Control Act,
while Aboud and Hakimoglu's case were based on the applicability of common law tort or dram shop liability.1 26 Second, Judge Becker disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the cause of action asserted by
Hakimoglu was precluded by the pervasive statutory regulation of casinos. 127 Judge Becker stated that determining the scope of tort liability has
traditionally been a function of the courts, not the legislature. 12 8 Furthermore, the logical extension of this preemption argument would lead to
the "absurd" conclusion that casinos would be absolved from liability when
they serve visibly intoxicated patrons who later kill others in drunk driving
accidents. 12 9 Finally, Judge Becker rebutted the problems explained by
by New Jersey law. Id. at 298-99 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Charles Bloom &
Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 652 A.2d 1238 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Lombardi v.
Marzulli, 553 A.2d 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); Atlantic N. Airlines v.
Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1953)).
121. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 298-99 (Becker, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 296; see Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp.
1312, 1321-23 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that casino could be liable for losses flowing
from its allowing intoxicated patron to gamble), af/'d on other grounds,34 F.3d 1227
(3d Cir. 1994); GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 655 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that "casino has a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting [patron] to gamble where that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated and/or under the
influence of a narcotic substance").
123. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 299 (Becker, J., dissenting).
124. 595 A.2d 1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
125. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 299 (Becker, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).

127. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting); see Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376-77
(N.J. 1994) ("We have recognized, in numerous settings, that traditional principles
of tort liability can be adapted to address areas in which recognition of a cause of
action and the imposition of a duty of care are both novel and controversial.");

Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (NJ. 1984) ("Determinations of the scope
of duty in negligence cases has traditionally been a function of the judiciary.").

129. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 300 (Becker, J., dissenting). "It cannot be the case
...that a host is liable for injuries that his guest sustained after drinking at a
dinner party while casinos are absolved from liability for drunk driving accidents,
even to third parties, under New Jersey law." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
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the district court in Hakimoglu that prohibited finding a cause of action in
1 30

tort.

V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS
PRACTICING IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

The Third Circuit's ruling in Hakimoglu, under New Jersey's dram
shop liability scheme, probably does not create a duty on behalf of casinos
to prevent visibly intoxicated patrons from gambling. 13 1 The Third Circuit's conclusion that the expansion of tort liability is a task for the New
Jersey Legislature or the New Jersey Supreme Court is important to note
because it demonstrates the Third Circuit's recognition that its decision in
Hakimoglu is only a prediction of what the New Jersey Supreme Court
would decide under similar circumstances.13 2 Therefore, despite the
Third Circuit's decision in Hakimoglu, the law in this area is not yet well13 3
defined.
Practitioners favoring the extension of dram shop liability to casinos
that allow intoxicated patrons to gamble can make arguments based upon
other New Jersey federal court cases. GNOC Corp. v. Aboud,' 34 which was
decided by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
held that a casino had a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting a pa130. Id. at 300-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker first rejected the arguments that the aggrieved gambler had no inhibitions that alcohol could overcome. Id. at 300-01 (BeckerJ., dissenting). Second, he asserted the premise that
the gambler was seeking the risk of losing money. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
Third, Judge Becker found that gambling often requires some level of skill, and
even when no skill is required, alcohol can have an effect on the gambler's judgment about when to stop playing. Id. at 301 (Becker, J., dissenting). Fourth,
although there may be problems with proximate causation, it is possible that New
Jersey would still recognize a cause of action. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Fifth, the
courts must not worry about a floodgate of fraudulent claims because "the casinos
can protect themselves." Id. at 301-02 (Becker, J., dissenting). Sixth, although
there is deterrence for casinos not to issue markers to drunk patrons, there is not
ample protection for patrons who gamble with cash. Id. at 302 (Becker, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Becker concluded that the legal authority and policy of the
Casino Commission do not affect how the New Jersey Supreme Court may decide
this common law action. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
131. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 293.
132. Id. Judge Alito stated:
While [the Third Circuit] is required to venture this prediction and while
[it] recognize[s] the need to issue a published opinion for the guidance
of the district courts in the circuit, [it] understand[s] that [its] decision
here is unlikely to have-and should not have-lasting precedential significance. [The Third Circuit] expect[s] that claims such as those advanced by [Hakimoglu] will work their way up through the New Jersey
court system and that the NewJersey appellate courts will provide a definitive answer to the question ....
Id.
133. Id. The Third Circuit noted that "it is not clear which way the NewJersey
Supreme Court would rule on this question ....
Id.
134. 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989).
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135
tron to gamble while the patron was obviously and visibly intoxicated.

Additionally, Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc.,13 6 which was affirmed
by the Third Circuit, held that the Casino Control Commission does not
have exclusive control over claims by a gambler to recoup gambling losses
13 7
from a casino that accrued while the patron was intoxicated.
Utilizing the Third Circuit's decision in Hakimoglu and Judge Irenas's
lengthy footnote in Tose, however, practitioners could argue persuasively
that neither tort nor contract claims should be permitted by the New
13 8
Jersey Supreme Court under NewJersey's pervasive Casino Control Act.
39
Additionally, Miller v. Zoby,1 decided by the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court, supports the proposition that because the Casino Control Act is so "extraordinarily pervasive and intensive" it does not
allow an implied private cause of action. 140 Additionally, the Act does not
include, nor does the legislative history of the Act discuss, a provision for a
gambler to recoup gambling losses sustained while intoxicated. 4 1 Therefore, it could be argued that it is highly unlikely that the legislature did not
consider that gamblers would gamble while intoxicated when the Casino
Control Act specifically provided for free alcoholic beverages to be served
142
at gaming tables.
Practitioners could also argue that public policy does not support allowing a cause of action under dram shop liability for casino patrons who
lose large sums of money while intoxicated.' 43 The emphasis of dram
shop liability for tavern owners is to protect innocent victims and intoxicated patrons from injury or property damage caused by the alcohol
server's negligence.' 44 Typical dram shop liability holds taverns and servers of alcoholic beverages liable for personal injury or property damage
which occurs as a result of intoxication. 145 It is only the casino patron,
however, who suffers economic damages when he or she gambles while
135. Id. at 655. For further discussion of the holding in Aboud, see supranotes
86-90 and accompanying text.

136. 819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.NJ. 1993), affid on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d
Cir. 1994).
137. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc. v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1235 (3d Cir.
1994). Therefore, the courts have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. Id.
For further discussion of the holding in Tose, see supranotes 91-99 and accompanying text.
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 to -210 (West 1996).
139. 595 A.2d 1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
140. Id. at 1110 (quoting Lomonaco v. Sands Hotel Casino and Country Club,

614 A.2d 634, 636 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992)).

141. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D.N.J.
1994), af]d, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
142. Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 n.8
(D.N.J. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994).
143. Hakimoglu, 876 F. Supp. at 632.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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intoxicated. 14 6 Consequently, public policy does not support extending
147
dram shop liability to cover this purely economic loss.

In conclusion, the New Jersey courts would most likely try a claim,
such as the one brought before the Third Circuit by Hakimoglu, based on
dram shop liability or another tort cause of action. Considering the holding of the Third Circuit in Hakimoglu, however, it is doubtful that the New
Jersey courts would recognize the extension of dram shop liability to a
situation where an intoxicated gambler loses money at a casino.
Jessica L. Krentzman
146. Hallam, supra note 2, at 253. "Dram shop law ...is not an exact analogy
[to a casino allowing an intoxicated patron to gamble] ...because existing dram

shop law only involves damage to person or property. The gambler's loss, in contrast, is purely economic." Id.
147. See GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 656 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating
that jury must determine "breach," "proximate cause," and "damages" because
court found duty to intoxicated gambler; but, observing courts limit liability in
accordance with public policy). See also Hallam, supra note 2, at 254-56 (discussing
recovery for pure economic loss in modem tort law).
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